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I n the 1960s, economic growth seemed
to be the tonic for poverty. From 1960 to
1969, real gross domestic product (GDP)
grew at a 4.1 percent average annual
rate, while the percentage of all persons
in poverty declined at an annualized 5.9
percent. Had the 1960s' relationship
between real GDP growth and poverty
reduction been maintained, the share of
all Americans in poverty, or the "poverty
rate," would have been only 8.2 percent
by 1992. The actual 1992 poverty rate,
however, was nearly twice as large.
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A significantly weaker relationship
between poverty relief and aggregate
growth in the decade following the 1960s
is understandable. In contrast to the long
uninterrupted expansion of the 1960s,
economist Rebecca Blank notes that
"... the thirteen years between 1970 and
1982 contained four business cycles,...
five years of negative GNP growth, and a
rapid increase in both inflation and
unemployment. It is perhaps not surpris-
ing that poverty is less responsive to
short and sequential upturns and down-
turns in the economy."
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What is surprising is the apparent lack of
progress against poverty throughout the
1980s. In a decade that featured one of
the longest peacetime economic expan-
sions in U.S. history, the share of all per-
sons in poverty actually rose moderately.
It appears that the benefits of robust eco-
nomic growth "trickled down" to the
poor in declining measure.
A more formal economic analysis seems
to confirm these simple findings. During
the 1960s, a 1 percent increase in the
annual growth of real GDP was typically
accompanied by a 0.4 percentage-point
reduction in the poverty rate (see table
1). In the 1970s, however, the effect of
GDP growth on poverty reduction was
slightly more than half that amount, and
this weaker relationship persisted
throughout the 1980s.
What caused the formerly strong correla-
tion between output growth and poverty
reduction to break down? Economists
have offered several plausible explana-
tions, including demographic shifts, pol-
icy changes, and increased wage and
income inequality. This Economic Com-
mentary explores each of these notions,
then considers an alternative view: When
poverty is defined based not on annual
income but on what is actually consumed
in a year, there is no discernible break in
the "trickle-down" mechanism.
• Why a Breakdown?
Demographics
A significant demographic shift that
might have affected income poverty
rates in the 1970s and 1980s was the
surge in divorce and out-of-wedlock
births. Because female-headed house-
holds typically have the highest poverty
rates of all family types, growth in this
population translates strongly into
poverty growth. By 1989, slightly more
than half of all poor families were
headed by a single woman. The shift
toward more female-headed households
Official poverty rates remained stub-
bornly high throughout the 1980s
despite a prolonged expansion.
Much has been made of this appar-
ent breakdown in the poor's share of
economic gains. But when poverty is
measured based on consumption
rather than on annual income, a dif-
ferent picture emerges. Comparing
growth in various macroeconomic
indicators with changes in consump-
tion poverty rates reveals no change
in the "trickle-down" mechanism in
the 1980s.
was largely completed by the late 1970s,
however, leaving us without an explana-
tion for the persistence of poverty rates
in the 1980s.
Single women with children may also be
less responsive to changes in overall
labor market conditions. The "feminiza-
tion" of poverty would thus tend to imply
that the growth solution to poverty is be-
coming increasingly inappropriate. How-
ever, while the share of female-headed
households in poverty was increasing
during the 1960s and 1970s, the repre-
sentation of the elderly—a group that is
even less responsive to labor-market
changes—was in dramatic decline, par-
tially mitigating this effect. Still, the pro-
portion of the poor accounted for by
these two groups rose from slightly more
than 30 percent to nearly 50 percent from
1959 to 1969, and has hovered around 50
percent since then.This pattern is consistent with the de-
creased responsiveness of poverty to
output growth in the 1970s and 1980s.
Even within demographic groups, how-
ever, the value of growth as a tonic for
poverty has declined over time.
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suggests that the experience of the 1980s
really reflected a fundamental structural
change in the way aggregate growth
translates into individual well-being. It
also implies that aggregate growth
would have become a less effective
poverty-fighting strategy in the 1980s




Changes in government transfer policies
(such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children) appear to be a more promising
explanation. Reforms initiated by the
Reagan administration in 1981 made wel-
fare participation less attractive, which
may have resulted in lower incomes for
some of the poor and near-poor. Real
transfers grew at an average annual rate
of 6 percent in both the 1960s and the
1970s, but at 2 percent in the 1980s. Such
policy changes may have offset gains to
the poor from overall economic growth,
consistent with the persistently high lev-
els of poverty in the 1980s.
Even accounting for demographic and
policy factors, though, the qualitative dif-
ferences between the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s persist. The second column of
table 1 reports findings after correcting
for the growth in real government trans-
fers and the population of female-headed
households. As expected, excluding
these factors caused us to somewhat
overstate the impact of aggregate growth
in the 1960s and to somewhat understate
its impact in the 1970s and 1980s. How-
ever, the effect of growth on poverty in
the 1980s continued to be small relative
to the experience of the 1960s.
Widening Wage and
Income Inequality
Several scholars have pointed to a widen-
ing disparity in wages, including real
declines in the wages of low-skilled
workers, as the primary cause of the
weakening relationship between growth
and poverty reduction.
5 According to




















NOTE: Reported coefficients are statistically significant from zero. Coefficients for 1960-1969
are significantly larger than coefficients for 1970-1979 and 1980-1989.
SOURCE: Author's calculations using data from the U.S. Census Bureau and Economic Report of
the President.
FIGURE 1 ALTERNATIVE POVERTY RATES, 1959-1989
Percent of persons in poverty
23
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SOURCES: U.S. Census Bureau; and Slesnick (footnote 6).
bottom of the earnings ladder rapidly
diminished, aggregate growth decreas-
ingly translated into poverty reductions.
The conclusion is that beginning in the
late 1970s, a structural change in the
economy led to increasing income
inequality and to a decreasing ability to
"grow out" of poverty.
• The Mismeasurement
of Poverty
Recent work by economist Daniel
Slesnick suggests that flaws in poverty
measurement have led to misleading
conclusions about poverty trends.
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problem is that annual income is often
an imperfect indicator of economic well-
being. For example, an elderly family
may be income poor but asset rich, and
thus able to maintain much the same
lifestyle as a well-to-do younger family
by spending their retirement savings.
This suggests that a much more accurate
indicator of the economic well-being of
families is their consumption. Consump-
tion depends not only on current annual
income, but also on anticipated income
in all future years, accumulated wealth
(acquired from past income), and the
degree of flexibility to reallocate these
resources by borrowing and saving. We
can infer consumption levels by making
adjustments to available data on house-
hold expenditures.
Figure 1 contrasts the official income
poverty rate from 1959 to 1989 with the
comparable Jorgenson-Slesnick (JS)
consumption poverty rate.
7 The JS rate
uses a consumption poverty threshold,
computed to be logically consistent with
the official income poverty threshold.
Both the levels and trends of the two
rates are quite different. Except for a
period in the late 1960s, the official
poverty rate is higher than the JS rate.
Although both rates decline from 1961 to
the early 1970s, they paint starkly differ-
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NOTE: Reported coefficients are statistically significant from zero. Coefficients for all periods are
not significantly different from each other.
SOURCE: Author's calculations using data from the U.S. Census Bureau and Economic Report of
the President.
While the official rates indicate a strong
resurgence of poverty in the early 1980s
and persistently high rates thereafter, the
JS rate, after a sharp increase around the
recessionary trough in 1980, declined
substantially over the 1980s.
• Aggregate Growth and
Consumption Poverty
The first column of table 2 reports the
estimated effects of real GDP growth
on the consumption poverty rate. A
1 percentage-point increase in the
growth rate of real GDP is associated
with a reduction in consumption
poverty of about 0.23 percentage point
in both the 1960s and 1970s, and about
0.19 percentage point in the 1980s. The
estimated effects in each decade are so
similar that we can reject the idea of a
structural change in the trickle-down
mechanism in the 1980s.
Real GDP is one of several alternative
macroeconomic growth indicators. In
the income poverty context, its use
amounts to examining the degree to
which the income-poor population par-
takes in aggregate income growth. Anal-
ogously, we can compare real personal
consumption expenditure (PCE) growth
with consumption poverty. The question
is, were the consumption gains of the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s decreasingly
reflected in the consumption of the poor
over time?
The second column of table 2 presents
the estimated effects of real PCE growth
on the JS poverty rate. Aggregate PCE
growth of 1 percentage point was asso-
ciated with percentage-point reductions
in consumption poverty of 0.32 in the
1960s, 0.33 in the 1970s, and 0.31 in
the 1980s. Again, there is no statistical
evidence that the relationship between
growth and consumption poverty has
changed since the 1960s.
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• Interpreting the Findings
As stated earlier, scholars have argued
that most of the stagnation in progress
against income poverty can be attributed
to structural change, not to more easily
understood causes such as a regime
change in policy or an obvious demo-
graphic trend. However, taking a fresh
look at the way we measure poverty
leads to the conclusion that the alleged
break in the trickle-down mechanism is
quite sensitive to the poverty concept
employed. Using a measure that is on a
superior conceptual footing, there seems
to be practically as much scope for
growing out of poverty as ever.
Why do these two measures yield such
different interpretations of the past 30
years? One conjecture is that the trend
toward female-headed families drove up
income, but not consumption, poverty
rates over the 1970s, and accounted for
some of the failure of aggregate income
gains to redress income poverty.
9 How-
ever, this cannot explain the different con-
clusions about poverty and growth em-
ploying these two measures in the 1980s.
Policy changes may also have differen-
tially affected income and consumption
poverty rates. For example, Medicaid has
come to represent an increasingly impor-
tant share of welfare benefits. While the
value of Medicaid insurance and actual
benefits paid are not reflected directly in
either the standard (income) or JS (con-
sumption) poverty rate, such transfers
may indirectly affect the consumption
poverty rate. The increasing availability
and generosity of Medicaid, particularly
in the 1980s, may have caused people to
worry less about potential medical costs
and to spend funds formerly set aside
against such contingencies. These types
of policy changes would show up in
lower consumption poverty rates
(through increased consumption), but
would have no effect on (official) income
poverty rates. Thus, it is possible that a
breakdown in the growth effect on con-
sumption poverty was obscured by miti-
gating changes in policy.
Finally, recent research suggests that up
to half of the greater earnings inequality
observed from the late 1970s through the




annual and permanent income trends
seem to have diverged. Because theory
suggests that consumption is more closely
related to permanent income, this phe-
nomenon could result in increased in-
come, but not consumption, poverty
rates. This would help to explain why the
two poverty series are so divergent over
the 1980s.
A first look at the consumption poverty
data suggests at the very least that the
picture of increasing inequality and the
failure of the 1980s' "rising tide" to lift
all boats may be exaggerated. The poor
appear to benefit from a vigorously
expanding economy now as much as be-
fore. After considering this new evi-
dence, it is not at all clear that a policy
to promote overall growth (and hence to
expand aggregate consumption opportu-
nities) is of declining interest to Ameri-
cans below the poverty line.• Footnotes
1. The official government poverty rate, com-
puted for all years since 1959, is the propor-
tion of the population with annual pre-tax,
post-transfer income below specified levels,
called "poverty thresholds" or "poverty lines."
2. See Rebecca Blank, "Why Were Poverty
Rates So High in the 1980s?" in D.B.
Papadimitriou and E. Wolff, eds., Poverty and
Prosperity in the USA in the Late Twentieth
Century, chapter 2. New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1993, p. 27.
3. Ibid.
4. Even so, promoting growth might still be a
more effective long-run poverty reliever than
other policies.
5. See, for example, Blank (footnote 2) and
David Cutler and Lawrence Katz, "Macro-
economic Performance and the Disadvan-
taged," Brookings Papers on Economic Activ-
ity, 1991 No. 2, pp. 1-61.
6. See Daniel Slesnick, "Gaining Ground:
Poverty in the Postwar United States," Jour-
nal of Political Economy, vol. 101, no. 1
(February 1993), pp. 1-38.
7. Daniel Slesnick developed the basis for
his poverty computations with Dale Jorgen-
son. For further details, see Slesnick (ibid.).
8. The careful reader might be curious about
the estimated relationship between PCE
growth and income poverty. A 1 percent
increase in real PCE growth is associated
with poverty reductions of-0.44, -0.24, and
-0.27 percentage point in the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s, respectively. There is no statisti-
cal difference between the 1970s and 1980s
estimates, while the latter periods are signifi-
cantly different from the 1960s. These find-
ings are strikingly similar to those obtained
using real GDP growth.
9. Female-headed households are less likely
to be classified as poor under the consump-
tion standard, because the average age of
children is lower in female-headed house-
holds than in other households with children,
and younger children tend to consume less.
10. See Peter Gottschalk and Robert Moffitt,
"The Growth of Earnings Instability in the
U.S. Labor Market," Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, 1994 No. 2, pp. 217-54.
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